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Politics of a Transformative Rural:
Development, Dispossession and
Changing Caste-Relations in West
Bengal, India
Ritanjan Das
1 Displacement from land and the concomitant dispossession of economic and social capital
is arguably one of the biggest domains of struggle in contemporary rural and peri-urban
India. It is, however, hardly a new phenomenon, as from the widely prevalent and rarely
accountable land encroachment practices during colonial times through to the Nehruvian
project  of  nation  building  post-independence,  narratives  of  land  acquisition  and
associated displacements remain all too familiar to date. There is ongoing dispossession
of farmers induced by state-sponsored property speculation and business interests in
many forms: SEZs (Levien 2012, 2013; Cross 2014), large scale mining projects (Padel and
Das 2010),  conservation  (Münster  and  Münster 2012),  agribusiness,  housing,  and
industrialization (Nielsen 2018; Nielsen and Oskarsson 2017; Akram-Lodhi 2009). In fact,
close  to  100  million  people  are  likely  to  have  been  displaced  since  independence
(Cernea 2016).
2 The theme of struggles around land and the associated rural transformation are of course
major  characteristics  of  contemporary  development  politics  in  India,  where  the
transition to capitalism is more entrenched today than ever before (Harriss-White and
Heyer 2015:4). Continually newer, more efficient modes of resource capitalism—or, the
“extraction of value from nature” at minimal costs (Woods 2011:53)—are accompanying
high economic growth. The accumulation of capital through dispossession of rural lands,
forests, and other raw materials (Levien 2012; Goldman 2011; Gooptu 2011, etc.) appears
to  have  favored  corporate  businesses,  industrial  or  real  estate,  with  “city  making”
emerging as a key avenue for profitable investments (Levien 2012;  Harriss-White and
Heyer  2015:10–11).  Social  differentiation  and  precarity  have  also  intensified
correspondingly.  Dispossessions  have  contributed  to  the  rise  of  vulnerable,
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disenfranchised, casual labor on a significant scale. Swelled ranks of “footloose labour”
employed in low-wages causal jobs are unmistakable across rural and urban areas today
(Breman 2007;  Guerin,  Venkatsubramian,  and Michiels 2015).  Among the  far  reaching
upshots  of  these  transforming  forces,  one  of  the  most  notable  has  been  the
reconstruction of the “urban” as a crucial and strategic site for the unfolding of global
and national scale projects, which in turn has not only led to a concomitant reduction of
the perceived value of the rural (Roy 2002, 2005; Sassen 2006), but as this paper goes on to
demonstrate, also a fundamental shift in rural socioeconomic relations.
3 The story that unfurls in this paper recounts the transformation of Rajarhat—an erstwhile
rural settlement in the state of West Bengal, adjacent to state capital Kolkata—into an
upmarket satellite township, comprised mostly of business/IT hubs, luxury real estate,
and  shopping  malls.  Although  seen  as  a  symbol  of  Kolkata’s  resurgence,  Rajarhat  is
simultaneously a  story of  “continuous cycle[s]  of  evictions,  expropriations,  ecological
degradation, and social protest” (Bose 2013:127). Furthermore, political struggles around
displacement  aside,  Rajarhat  also  provides  an  intriguing  window  into  the  subtle,
multifaceted  transformation  of  socio-economic  relations  within  the  remnants  of
erstwhile  rural  spaces,  viewed through a  lens  of  changing caste-relations  and newer
forms of economic engagement. While land struggles in West Bengal have been under
extensive scrutiny in recent times, there has hardly been any attempt to understand the
social conditions within which such struggles play out, and are metamorphosed in turn.
The effort in this paper is therefore to demonstrate (1) the nature of rural transformation
brought about the process of urbanization in Rajarhat (which is demonstrative of similar
processes across the country), and (2) explore how such transformations have also led to
an evolving dichotomy along caste-lines, the emergent forms of economic engagements
emanating from the rural transformation giving traditional caste-dynamics new forms of
expression. The scant attention towards caste-relations in West Bengal in the mainstream
literature—due to a rather limited electoral aggregation of caste interests (Sinharay 2012)
—makes such forms more significant. However, this long-held political myth has recently
come under some serious scrutiny via a series of works demonstrating the deep-rooted
embeddedness  of  caste  hierarchies  in  Bengali  politics  (Bandyopadhyay 2012;
Samaddar 2013; Chatterjee 2012; Chandra, Heierstad and Nielsen 2015). This paper adds to
this literature by deconstructing the Rajarhat story—interrogating both the land struggles
and the implicit caste dimensions around the rural transformation. Methodologically, the
paper is based on an exploratory ethnographic field research in Rajarhat. While a number
of interviews (especially with the bureaucrats and political leaders) were conducted in
Kolkata, the bulk of the fieldwork was spread across 10 sample villages (out of a total of
47), chosen on the basis of an even geographic spread across the entire area of Rajarhat. 
The story presented below emerges out of around 50 interviews conducted with villagers
and farmers, bureaucrats, politicians and local political cadres, and syndicate members.
Drawing on thematic content analysis and narrative analysis of the interview data, the
story demonstrates the complex and contested dynamics at the ground level that usually
remain unnoticed.
4 A  final  point  needs  to  be  made  about  the  unique  socio-political  context  of  the  state.
Historically,  West  Bengal  was an aberration—an island of  political  stability—amidst  a
rather  chaotic  Indian democracy.  It  was  ruled  by  the  Left  Front  (LF)  government,  a
coalition of Left parties spearheaded by the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPIM),
uninterruptedly  from  1977  to  2011.  The  CPIM/LF  regime  brought  significant  land
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reforms, as well as proper democratic decentralization via the panchayati-raj (a system of
rural self-governance), and gained unprecedented popularity as a government for the
poor.  However,  through the 1990s and early 2000s it  gradually  adopted a  more pro-
market stance, pursuing a private-capital led industrialization agenda, which even led to
the regime securing a historic majority in the 2006 state elections. However, it suffered
steady electoral decline soon after, eventually capitulating to the main opposition party
Trinamool Congress (TMC) in 2011. And it is precisely in the regime’s final term that West
Bengal also came to feature prominently in the context rural land struggles, the well-
documented  Singur-Nandigram episodes  being  cases  in  point  (Das 2016;  Sarkar  and
Chowdhury 2009).  Not  only  did  Singur-Nandigram spark nationwide debates  about  the
nature and legality of acquisition methods, but it also marked critical junctures in the
state’s political fortunes. The LF, having returned to power for an unprecedented seventh
consecutive term in 2006, completely collapsed under the crisis that emerged from its
high-handedness in acquiring farmland for private entrepreneurs in these two hamlets. It
is this dichotomous backdrop against which the Rajarhat narrative needs to be told, one
where  private  industrialization and neo-liberal  urbanism was  embraced by  a  regime
having built its political capital as pro-poor and pro-farmer, and in a state that was a
bastion of Marxist political forces for over three decades.
5 The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  the  next  section,  section  two,  provides  a  brief
theoretical overview of the nature of rural transformation via land acquisition induced
displacement-dispossession. Section three introduces the Rajarhat story, and brings the
politics,  socio-economic  transformation  and  emergence  of  new  forms  of  economic
arrangements in the area (low-level  cartels or “syndicates”) to the fore.  Section four
shifts the focus to the largely overlooked aspects of caste-consciousness in Rajarhat, and
examines how such consciousness found new expression in the transformative politics of
the rural society.
 
Theorizing Rural Transformation: Land Struggles and
Social Dominance
6 The structural shift in the value of land towards commodification (Akram-Lodhi 2007)
and the state’s transformation from an active promoter of public industries to a land-
broker  for  private  corporations  (Levien 2013)  are  among the  most  notable  effects  of
contemporary  capitalist  forces  of  accumulation.  But  while  such  effects  of  capitalist
accumulation  remain  the  focus  of  much  of  the  literature  on  land,  the  process  of
dispossession-displacement  also  needs  to  be  analytically  fleshed  out,  the  “means  by
which changes of land use and differential access take place and … the varying forms of
resistance or compliance by different groups and individuals over time” (Gardner and
Gerharz 2016:2).1 In contemporary India/South Asia, for example, dispossession from land
displays  both  a  certain  continuity  and  change  in  comparison  to  earlier  periods
(Adnan 2016). State-led acquisition, albeit age-old, continues to change significantly in
purpose towards supplying land to private corporations. Moreover, the very notion of
dispossession “implies  a  straightforward transfer  of  rights  in  which those  that  once
possessed are dispossessed … [but]  the local  realities  … are often far  more nuanced,
involving  complex  interrelationships  between  groups  of  users,  legality,  the  state”
(Gardner and Gerharz 2016:2).  There is thus an evolving discussion about appropriate
theoretical frameworks, especially building on Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation
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(1976) and Harvey’s (2003) conceptualization of “accumulation by dispossession” (ABD),
alongside  newer  perspectives  on  market-driven  processes  of  dispossession  (Akram-
Lodhi 2012),  extra-economic  coercion  (Levien 2012),  non-market  transactions
(Khan 2004), and voluntary processes based on persuasion, incentives, and temptation
(Adnan 2016). Naturally, this discussion is often at analytical crossroads. However, such
divergence only indicates the complexities involved in the local  realities of  land use,
which in a sense is also the point of convergence amongst this varied literature, as its
main  aim  remains  to  explore  the  nuanced  and  complex  interrelationships  between
groups  of  users,  legality,  the  state,  and  customary  forms  of  access,  cross  cutting
discourses of development, modernity, belonging and rights (Gardner and Gerharz 2016).
7 Most of these mechanisms are clearly at play across much of the developing nations. In
India,  however,  what  is  interesting to  note  (but  often overlooked)  is  how this  fuzzy
domain  of  displacement-dispossession  allows  traditional  social  forces  (like  caste)  to
reinvent/reassert  themselves  in  newer  forms.  This  is  not  necessarily  a  recent
observation, but one that tends to get glossed over in the more procedural and legislative
criticisms of land acquisition. An affirmation of this observation can, however, be found
in Le Mons Walker’s (2008) seminal work on neoliberalism on the ground in rural India.
As a strategy of capital  accumulation,  she writes,  the neoliberal  project has revolved
crucially  around  the  transfer  of  property  and  land  use  rights,  and  the  exclusion  of
massive numbers of rural people from the accumulation process:
To the extent that their exclusion has been achieved through expropriation and
dispossession,  it  has formed the basis not only for the transfer of  property and
property rights, but also in many if not most instances for the swelling of the ranks
… of a “reserve army” of cheap expendable labour—another key component of the
neoliberal accumulation strategy. (Walker 2008:605)
State-based land seizures, the dispossession of significant numbers of the rural poor, and
the agrarian conflict they have engendered have been key features of the playing out of
neoliberalism in the Indian countryside. She further observes:
These conflicts reflect state policies that underpinned and contributed to agrarian
deterioration and crisis. The dominant classes, including both larger higher-caste
and intermediate  landholders,  responded by attempting to preserve their  social
positions and modes of accumulation by thwarting the attempts of poorer peasants
and rural laborers to improve their livelihoods. The initiatives of these classes have
included  both  economic  devices  and  extra-economic  coercion,  and  in  many
instances they have produced as well a new unity and “closing of the ranks” among
the landholders. (Walker 2008:595)
There are various examples of such high-caste dominance, from the use of private armies
by upper-caste landlords in Bihar to caste based atrocities on agricultural laborers by
landholders in Tamil Nadu. As Le Mons Walker argues further, in a neoliberal context,
such new forms of violence (often in the shape of caste-based atrocities) form the political
and social corollary to the economic internal colonization of the poor (Walker 2008:595).
Therefore,  the  reconfiguration  of  caste  relations  as  a  result  of  contemporary  land
struggles and how such struggles themselves are being shaped through traditional caste-
based hierarchies,  are both important areas to explore.  The Rajarhat story is a prime
example  of  this.  While  theoretical  constructs  such  as  ABD,  market-led  forces  of
dispossession around land struggle,  etc.  give  this  paper  its  analytical  grounding and
connect to the wider phenomenon of capitalist accumulation, the challenge is to make
sense of such associated reconfigurations of social dynamics on the ground.
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Displacement, Rural Transformation, and Rise of the 
Syndicate-Raj in Rajarhat
8 Kolkata,  the  capital  of  West  Bengal,  is  often characterized as  “the  city  that  got  left
behind” (Anon 2012). Since 1977, while the LF (and particularly the CPIM) consolidated
itself politically via the twin measures of land reforms and panchayati raj—along with a
series of political maneuvers that allowed the “party” to entrench itself as a hegemonic
entity in every state institution—the industrial fortunes of West Bengal had continued to
dwindle. Riddled with stagnant industrialization, gradual loss of urban political ground,
and dire infrastructural conditions (Das and Mahmood 2015), the LF took up the mantle of
urban development by early 1990, which became the primary catalyst in its attempt at an
economic rejuvenation. The government aggressively sought to transform Calcutta into a
world-class city, following the “predictable formula of elite enclaves of residence and
leisure,  economic  zones  …  and  civic  campaigns  to  insure  beauty  and  order”  (Roy
2011:259).  The Kolkata  new town project,  located in the Rajarhat  area on the north-
eastern fringes  of  the  city,  was  its  premier  program:  a  self-contained,  environment-
friendly  planned settlement  to  ease  Kolkata’s  population  pressure,  and  also  a  major
business  and  IT  hub,  under  the  aegis  of  the  West  Bengal  Housing  and  Industrial
Development Corporation or HIDCO (HIDCO 1999).
9 Geographically, the entire Rajarhat block amounted to an area of 107.87 sq. km, and had
47 inhabited villages, 54523 households, and a net population of 417192 (mostly low-caste
and Muslims, see Table 4) by 2001 (District Statistical Handbook 2003). The entire block
was  divided  into  55  mouzas,2 25  of  which  were  initially  notified  for  acquisition  in
accordance  with  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  of  1894.3 As  per  the  first  land  use  plan
(HIDCO 1995), the total Rajarhat project area was 2750 hectares, allocation of land being as
follows: 30.5% residential,  7.3% industrial,  5.5 percent commercial,  1.1 percent social/
educational/healthcare  facilities,  8.8  percent  roads/transportation,  and  47.6  percent
open space.  Following  several  revisions,  by  2010  the  allocations  were:  41.77  percent
residential,  0.23  percent  industrial,  5  percent  IT  services,  11  percent  commercial,  8
percent  social  facilities,  12  percent  transportation,  and  22  percent  open  spaces
(Mukherjee 2016).4 Contrary to initial objectives, Rajarhat thus gradually emerged not as
an industrial or commercial hub, but a largely residential settlement. The area is now
primarily  divided  into  Action  Areas  I  (677  hectares),  II  (1310  hectares)  and  III  (783
hectares), designed to accommodate approximately 1 million people, along with another
0.5  million from the  floating  population (HIDCO 2012). However,  behind the  story  of
successful  urban  development  remained  a  plethora  of  conflicting  elements,
demonstrating the fuzzy terrain of development-displacement at Rajarhat. In particular,
there are three issues that need elaboration.
10 The first is the issue of limited compensation and the violent nature of displacement. As
per one estimate, most of the land was acquired for Rs. 300,000/acre, almost half the
market price of Rs. 600,000 (Johnson and Chakravarty 2013) . Another estimate is  that
HIDCO purchased land at Rs. 5–6,000/katha5 against the officially registered rate of Rs. 4–
50,000 (Sengupta 2008), selling it within a year or two at Rs. 60,000/katha, and even at Rs.
200,000/katha (Johnson and Chakravarty 2013) . What is more intriguing though, is the
nature of displacement in Rajarhat. In 1999, the government published a report titled:
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“Report of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Committee for Project Affected People
(PAP) of New Town Project.” It read:
A unique feature of this project [is] … a continuous dialogue between the PAP and
the project authorities … Consent of the PAP was obtained through discussions and
meetings. As a result the project has not been so far plagued with court cases and
litigation … The pro-people attitude taken by the project authorities and the Govt.
should be emulated in other projects (GoWB 1999:5).
Compare this with the following excerpt from an investigative report published by The
Sanhati Collective.
The CPI(M) party leadership went on a land grabbing spree with the active collusion
of  the  local  police  and  administration. Poor  people  fearful  for  their  lives  were
forced to sign off their land at gunpoint … the whole area was under the grip of fear
and terror … Those who were unwilling to give up their land … were subject to
unmentionable strong-arm tactics. Many left hearth and home because of beatings
and  harassment. Those who  reported  to  the  police  were  murdered . (Sengupta
2008:4)
The two versions could not be more different. And while the second is a rather dystopian
account, tales of land grab, intimidation, and violence are not uncommon in Rajarhat. A
Nagarik Mancha6 publication, for example, notes that “land sharks became immediately
active in the area. Forceful land grabbing and dispossession also escalated rapidly. Buying
land in very low price, they later sold it at much higher rates … More than 50 people are
estimated to have been murdered in Rajarhat” (Dey 2011:6–8;  author’s  translation from
Bengali). Similar anecdotes, stories, and memories can still be heard aplenty if one enters
the remnants of erstwhile rural settlements in the area, demonstrating how “land [was]
looted from the local  villagers … the empty fields there represent[ing] … the death of
agriculture … its murder by capital, the savage commodification of land, and the resurgence of
private property in the city” (Dey, Samaddar and Sen 2013:19–20; emphasis added). Once
again, it is interesting that such high levels of disruption in an area with a 50 percent low-
caste and Muslim population still did not lead to any direct caste based mobilization,
something that would have been the expected course of events in most other states.
11 The second issue that needs to be addressed is the extent of transformation in rural
livelihood. What is the condition of these villages today? They continue to exist, but in a
severely constricted manner, as the development of the city required all the cultivable
land around each village, with only the habitational parts left out. Engulfed within the
urban sectors, remnants of these villages are euphemistically referred to as urban villages
(somewhat developed with better road connectivity with the urban sections). However,
irrespective of  the euphemism,  and despite  several  promises  by HIDCO to undertake
necessary developmental work, there remains a stark contrast between the posh urban
enclaves and the sorry state of the villages, which have essentially become extremely
dense living quarters with burgeoning populations, but with hardly any public spaces,
along with choked sewage systems, narrow roads, and unsafe residential structures.
12 Having lost their agricultural livelihoods, the primary occupation of the villagers is to
rent  out  low-cost  accommodation  to  migrant  workers,  daily  wagers,  small-scale
businessmen,  or  do  odd  jobs  as  masons,  drivers,  carpenters,  security  guards,  and
housemaids. This is reflected in the following tables that document the rapidly reducing
farming opportunities in the area post-2000. Table 1 demonstrates the reduction in the
farming population from 2001–2004 when the Rajarhat project was in full swing; Table 2
shows the rapid fall in the net area under cultivation from 1996 onwards; and Table 3
documents the concomitant stagnation of agricultural, manufacturing workforces and a
Politics of a Transformative Rural: Development, Dispossession and Changing C...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 21 | 2019
6
rise in the “other’” category, which comprises of such small jobs (masons, drivers, guards,
etc.). Additionally, the government had promised to rehabilitate all evicted families and
to train and give employment to at least one family member. But a Comptroller and
Auditor General (CAG) report in 2007 noted that only 2691 individuals had been trained,
along  with  47  cooperative  societies  and  56  self-help  groups  set  up  with  just  3073
landowners. In fact, “even after a lapse of eight years, [HIDCO] had rehabilitated only 17
percent of  identified  project  affected  families  … and failed  to  identify  the  remaining
erstwhile landowners” (CAG 2007:27).7
 
Table 1: Changes in Farming Population in Rajarhat (2001–04)
Year Small farmers Marginal farmers
2001–02 12,105 6,170
2002–03 21,417 6,232
2003–04 10 3,890
Source: District Statistical Handbooks (2002–2004) 
 
Table 2: Land Distribution in Rajarhat (1996–2003)
Year
Net  Area  Under  Cultivation  (in
hectares)
Area  Under  Pasture  and  Orchard  (in
hectares)
1997 7,964.07 183.53
1998–2001
8
3,958 453
2002 3,911 453
2003 1,601.8 183.33
Source: District Statistical Handbooks (1997–2004)
 
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Workforce Population (2002–2004)
Year Cultivators
Agricultural
Laborers 
Household  Industrial
workers 
Other
workers
 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
2002 2.69 0.03 4.93 0.07 1.68 0.51 20.88 33.74
2004 9.7 0.6 16.4 0.3 5.8 1.7 68.1 97.4
Source: District Statistical Handbooks (2003, 2005)
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13 The third and final issue which needs to be explored is the emergence of new forms of
economic engagement in the area: in particular, what is commonly referred to as the
syndicate-raj. Rajarhat today is synonymous with “syndicates,” described in a recent news
article  as  “Kolkata’s  open  secret  of  extortion  rackets”  (Anon 2016).  Syndicates  are
essentially  low-level  cartels  that  have  gradually  turned  into  “businesses”  offering
“services like purchase of land, supply of building materials and engagement of laborers
to builders and property developers … extort[ing] money from petty shopkeepers, owners
of small and medium industrial units and others” (CAG 2007:25). Although consolidated
during the TMC government, the rise of the syndicates can be traced back to the last
decade of the LF rule. In the absence of industrial investment and the much promised
jobs, CPIM leaders decided to award a form of political compensation to the dispossessed,
allocating (informal) contracts to local youth for providing construction material in their
neighborhoods.  Gautam  Deb  (Housing  Minister  of  the  LF  and  the  chief  architect  of
Rajarhat) personally oversaw the proceedings. As he recalls:
I made sure that the local youth got necessary financial assistance and permits for
driving trucks,  which I  then hired back for construction/land-filling purposes.  I
also  instructed  that  HIDCO  gave  them  all  the  small  jobs—supplying  material,
building walls/fences and small pathways, planting trees, and also supplying labour
if required. We adjusted the system itself in order to accommodate such ventures.9
While this could have been an innovative business model to generate employment, on the
ground it  turned entirely into a party-mediated exercise.  The CPIM local  committees
were in charge of deciding to whom the contracts should be awarded in their respective
areas,  and  in  most  cases  contracts  went  to  party-affiliated  individuals  (Johnson and
Chakravarty 2013). This also gave rise to a certain form of rent-seeking, as a share of the
payments had to be paid back to local party elites, ensuring necessary political protection
and insulation from law-enforcing agencies (Roy 2016).
14 It is,  however, during the TMC rule that the syndicates have flourished, becoming an
almost indispensable political force. Before the 2016 state election, the current Rajarhat 
TMC MLA Sabyasachi Dutta was quoted as saying that he has 20,000 people working for
him, a TMC “army that keeps the syndicate machinery rolling and moonlights as the vote
mafia during elections” (Banerjee and Sengupta 2016). He further claimed:
If there is no syndicate, 20,000 people will die of starvation, the government will
fall. If I tell 20,000 people that you have to starve to death, even if 2,000 goons die
among them it would be a major crisis … Defeating me is not simply difficult, it’s
impossible (Roy 2016:24).
A senior TMC member, on conditions of anonymity, described the scale of the problem:
Currently there are about 270 operational syndicates, with connections right up to
the  ministry.  They  broadly  operate under  two  parallel  authority  umbrellas,
controlled  directly  by  two  cabinet  ministers.  The  daily  collection  of  all  the
syndicates is more than half a million. The chief minister is aware of the problem,
but given the money and people involved, it is an untouchable system.10
 
The Reproduction of Caste Relations in Rajarhat
15 Let  us  now  turn  to  the  core  question  of  the  story:  how  did  the  fuzzy  domain  of
displacement-dispossession at Rajarhat allow traditional caste dynamics in the villages to
reinvent and reassert themselves in newer forms? Answering this is a challenging task, as
no caste based mobilization had coalesced in Rajarhat.  This is not entirely unexpected
owing  to  the  exceptionalism  of  West  Bengal,  where  caste  has  been  notoriously
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understudied owing to  its  very distinctive  political  history.  Neither  during the  early
decades of Congress rule or the LF was caste a strategy of electoral mobilization, nor has
there  been  a  major  caste-based  social  movement  in  the  state.  This  is  particularly
noteworthy in the wider context of much more direct on ground caste dynamics in most
other states, where the political discourses have historically been framed along explicit
caste  lines.  However,  as  Chandra  and  Nielsen  (2012)  point  out,  if  one  looks  beyond
aggregate election data, caste does emerge as an important indicator of popular political
behavior in the state.11 But it  is  undeniable that  a prolonged Left  hegemony has led
somewhat to the ideological subsumption of caste by class, ostensibly underpinned by
loyalties forged “across divisions of caste and community” (Chatterjee 1997:69); and the
conspicuous socio-political dominance of the self-professed “casteless” Bengali bhadralok12
(Tawa Lama-Rewal 2009).
16 Contextualizing the Rajarhat story against such a backdrop poses a dual challenge. While
Rajarhat has been in news in light of the recent land acquisition strife in West Bengal, the
caste question has barely received any attention. And even if this is attributed to the
scant historical attention towards Bengali caste politics, the unfolding of events on the
ground did not  follow caste  lines  either.  Yet,  it  is  this  challenge that  also  raises  an
intriguing  dialectic.  How  does  the  salience  of  caste  hierarchies  continue  to  inform
everyday politics and structure political action, while reproducing its own invisibility at
every  turn?  This  is  probably  the  most  intriguing  outcome  of  the  extent  of  the
transformation witnessed in the villages of Rajarhat.
 
The Spatiality of Caste in Rajarhat Villages
17 Despite a conspicuous absence from political discourses, caste remains highly visible in
Rajarhat.  This is noticeable in the population demography of the area itself, Dalits and
Muslims being the two predominant groups. In fact, they made up more than 50 per cent
of the entire population in 2003, and remain at around 40 per cent according to the 2011
census data (see Table 4).  Across the 10 villages where the fieldwork was conducted,
Namasudra was clearly the most prominent caste, followed by Bagdi, Bhuimali, and (a few
households of) Hari.
 
Table 4: Dalit and Muslim Population in Rajarhat (2001–2003, 2011)13
Year Total Population Schedule Castes Muslims
2001 417,192 87,907 (21.07%) 109,504 (26.24%)
2003 417,192 102,867 (24.66%) -do- 
2011 592,737 141,513 (23.87%) 100,024 (16%)
Source: District Statistical Handbooks (2002, 2004, 2013)
18 In most villages,  the spatiality of  caste stands out,  as  there are distinct  segregations
between lower and upper-caste habitations, a fairly common phenomenon in West Bengal
villages, also noted by authors such as Roy (2012). The upper caste locations are usually
referred to as Bamun-para (locality of the Brahmins),  or sometimes even identified by
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specific surnames such as Chakrabarty-para or Ray-para (Chakrabarty and Ray being upper-
caste  surnames).  The  lower  caste  locations  are  relatively  mixed,  with  people  from
Namasudras, Bhuimali, Bagdi and other low castes living side by side. Interestingly, in a
number  of  villages  these  areas  are  commonly  addressed  as  the  purono-para  (the  old
locality), possibly indicative of the low-castes being the original inhabitants. There are
some instances of specific caste-named localities, such as Bagdi-para (locality of the Bagdi 
caste), Sardar-para,  and so on. Another name is also quite common in several villages:
notun-para (the new locality). These areas are usually located at the village peripheries
and are relatively new. The caste profile is fairly mixed and the houses are mostly rented
out  to  outsiders  who  work  in  the  neighboring  apartments  or  offices.  The  religious
segregation is, however, even starker, as the Muslim areas are very clearly demarcated,
usually known as the Molla-para (locality of the Muslims, Molla being the most common
Muslim surname in Rajarhat).
19 The following conversation with an old resident of Bamun-para in Aatghora village is very
clearly indicative of these segregations. Notice how the importance of the Bamun-para is
projected in relation to the nearest skyscraper.
My forefathers lived in this Bamun-para. My entire life has been spent here. Further
down this road is Mandal-para [locality of the Mandals]. There is a small market after
Mandal-para, the last shop being a butcher’s. The Molla-para starts after that. We go
up to the butcher’s shop, but usually don’t go beyond. The Bamun-para is right at
the centre of the village though. There’s a big tower only at a stone’s throw.14
The  spatial  segregation  is  reinforced  by  a  clear  economic  stratification.  There  is  a
difference  in  the  condition  of  the  houses  in  the  upper-caste  hamlets  and  they  are
noticeably more affluent. A typical Bamun-para house is more spacious, brightly painted,
has a  courtyard,  a  boundary wall,  and is  usually  two-to-three storied.  Houses  in the
lower-caste  hamlets  are  much  smaller  in  comparison,  mostly  one-storied,  sparsely
painted, and the localities are a lot more congested. Another noticeable difference is in
the workforce pattern. In Patharghata mouza,  for example, there are only a handful of
upper-caste houses in the middle of the village, with at least one member in each family
with a permanent job, some being government employees as well. In contrast, the rest of
the villagers are mostly doing small odd jobs or are self-employed. Anecdotes aplenty can
also be heard about upper-caste families having received substantial compensation as
opposed to the residents in other areas, indicating that the former owned comparatively
larger quantities of land.
 
The Emergent Bhadralok-Borolok-Chhotolok Tripartite and the
Syndicate-Raj
20 So how did such caste-consciousness play out in the context of the rural transformation?
Upon conversing with the villagers, it became evident that there is a strong sense of
frustration among large sections, having lost their permanent income source and having
not  received  the  promised  benefits.  Such  feelings  are  directed  both  towards  the
government, and also a section of the local elites with close proximity to the CPIM. This,
on the surface, plays out more in class terms: boro-lok (the big or rich people) vs gorib-lok 
(the poor people), the most common sentiment heard across villages being:
The  borolok had  their  party  connections,  and  some  made  enormous  profits
overnight. It’s only the gorib-lok whose conditions have steadily deteriorated.15
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Within a village, people are normally known to each other, and thereby the resentment
towards the borolok was specifically directed: the residents of this house here, the members of
that family there, or the owner of this shop or those new buildings—were clearly identified as
those with party-connections or even party members. Many such conversations in the
villages took the shape of expressing frustration towards the borolok for having exploited
the system and for the gorib-lok being left behind, couched in the class-terms that are
taken to be characteristic of common parlance in the countryside. However, in the over-
usage  of  this  typology,  what  often  remain  ignored  are  the  multiple  meanings  and
overlapping signaling of class as well as caste relations. It needs to be understood—and
this is  probably unique to West Bengal given the historic prominence of class in the
political discourse and yet underlying patterns of social organization along caste lines—
that there is a continuous interchange of class and caste identities in common parlance. A
clear  hint  at  this  interchangeability  came from a conversation with Mahesh Dhali,  a
dispossessed farmer running a tea-stall in Patharghata:
So what they are borolok? It’s only because they were close to the party that they
became borolok overnight. But that doesn’t mean they have become bhadralok. They
are still the chhotolok that they always were.16
This is a rather insightful statement. Upon pursuing a similar line of questioning, several
such responses were heard: a borolok for only two days can’t be a bhadralok; they might have
money, but they are chhotolok like us only,17 and so on.
21 So what does this  borolok-chhotolok-bhadralok tripartite imply? Here it  is  important to
recognize that these terms are not usually taken to be indicative of caste-identities, and
are in fact mostly used to indicate class-relations. The terms do not engage directly in
defining what caste is (jati, varna) or used to be. Instead, as Chandra, et al. (2015:2) point
out in their attempt to situate West Bengal exceptionalism, “caste implies different things
to different people at different times, and that caste is used politically in different ways”.
In the same vein, and in the context of socio-economic changes brought by the fuzzy
domain of displacement-dispossession in Rajarhat,  the terms borolok-bhadralok-chhotolok
have come to assume a multitude of meanings—interchanging between class and caste
lines—unpacking which can give us insights into the changing caste dynamics. The term
borolok is used to indicate the economically nouveau rich (so a class-term), but is also used
to indicate a degree of differentiation from the bhadralok in terms of the borolok’s lower
status in the social hierarchy (so a caste-term). There is a distinction between those who
became economically affluent over the course of the project but come from a lower social
stratum (the overnight borolok) and the traditionally or socially affluent (the bhadralok), as
the higher social status of the bhadralok cannot be replaced by economic affluence alone.
Even if the borolok is economically better off than the bhadralok, the latter continues to
enjoy a higher social standing (therefore caste identity is far more entrenched than class).
There are of course those who are bhadralok as well as borolok, and they are usually well-
respected. The term chhotolok, on the other hand, directly indicates a low-caste origin,
and when used in conjunction with borolok, it is the caste relation that is being implied,
and not class. Referring to the Bamun-para residents of his village, Mahesh Dhali made a
very incisive comment that uses all these terms with the multiplicity of meanings:
They are bhadralok, of course they will be borolok as well. But can the borolok become
bhadralok  just  by  having  money?  Family,  tradition,  education—where  will  the
chhotolok get these from?18
This is a key comment, playing with the multiplicity in meanings. In the first sentence,
the bhadralok (high caste) is expected to be a borolok as well. Here borolok is being used in a
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class sense (economic richness), as the higher social standing of the bhadralok is expected
to translate into greater economic affluence as well. But in the second sentence, borolok 
takes on a caste-meaning. Gains made in class-terms alone are not enough to alleviate the
low social status of the borolok (they cannot gain the respect of the high castes just by
having money). In the third line, the distinction is made even more explicit, when it is said
that  the  borolok  is  hardly  any  different  from  the  chhotolok  (the  low-castes),  as  the
economic gains of the former (progress made in class-terms) can hardly be a substitute
for the social capital of the traditional high castes, i.e. the bhadralok.
22 This is how caste-consciousness has found new forms of expression in Rajarhat villages.
Among  the  dispossessed,  the  lower-castes  and  the  Muslims  were  at  a  particular
disadvantage  given  their  lack  of  economic  and  social  capital.  But  the  surrounding
urbanization has brought certain economic opportunities for those close to the party
(particularly through “syndicates”),  and in almost every village there were groups of
young men—largely low caste and Muslims—who did gain quick financial benefits from
the urbanization process. But their rapid economic affluence could not elevate them to
the bhadralok status.  They became borolok  (used in a class-sense,  indicating economic
richness), but remained chhotolok (low caste) at the same time, as their riches were not a
substitute for heritage and tradition. Most villages in Rajarhat now have three groups of
people: the upper-caste bhadralok (most of whom are also borolok, as they are expected to
be), the ones who became borolok during the course of the project (who progressed in
class terms but not caste), and the chhotolok who continue in poverty (the archetypical
low-caste).  The Bengali  political  tradition ensures  that  the bhadralok  continues  to  be
respected  for  their  social/cultural  capital  and  upper-caste  heritage,  and even  if
economically stronger, the lower-caste borolok cannot escape from their chhotolok status
in the absence of that heritage.19
23 Now, this tripartite terminology has another crucial dimension if one examines the rise of
the syndicate-raj in Rajarhat. Although widespread, syndicates are notoriously difficult to
talk to in the villages of Rajarhat. It was only after a month in the field that access could
be  gained,  and  under  conditions  of  strict  anonymity.  While  reluctant  to  divulge
information about their operational structures and political linkages, the implicit caste
aspects—or  more  specifically,  the  bhadralok-borolok-chhotolok  dynamics—were  freely
discussed.  Among  the  syndicates  that  could  be  observed,  it  was  fairly  obvious  that
membership was  largely  drawn from lower-castes  and Muslim youth.  Among all  the
syndicates observed/interacted with, hardly any were members of the upper castes, the
Namasudra and Bagdi castes being the most prominent. This is perhaps not surprising
given the overall demography of Rajarhat, but the leadership was also reflective of this
trend.  There  are  two  local  leaders—Bhajai  Sardar  and  Aftabuddin—each  controlling
roughly 135 syndicates, the former a low-caste Hindu, the latter a Muslim. The overall
number and size of syndicates in Rajarhat have steadily risen since the CPIM days and
strengthened  significantly  in  the  TMC  era,  but  the  membership  character  has  not
changed  much,  attracting  unemployed  youth  (almost  exclusively  male)  from  the
minorities.
24 The  obvious  financial  opportunities  aside,  what  else  motivates  a  youth  to  join  a
syndicate? The leader of a small syndicate explained:
Of course there’s the money. But more important is ijjat (respect). We had no ijjat in
the village. We were born chhotolok, and would have remained so had it not been for
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the syndicate. Today I have 12 people working for me, I have political connections.
Even village elders talk to me with respect.20
Similar  sentiments were echoed by several  syndicate members.  A relatively new and
young recruit of a big syndicate admitted:
I have only studied till 8th standard. There was no steady income in the family. My
brother drives an autorickshaw. But now I have a good lifestyle. I will also have
connections and meet important people. No one will look down on me anymore.21
Alongside quick money, it is the search for ijjat that leads young men to join syndicates.
The most insightful comment came, however, not from a syndicate member, but from the
mother of a syndicate member. Upon asking why she allowed her son to join an illegal
business, she responded:
What  has  the  law  done  for  us?  They  gave  us  a  pittance  in  the  name  of
compensation,  and now our land is  worth millions.  We can never be like those
bhadralok living in our land, but if my son earns money, we can escape a chhotolok’s 
life.22
Thus we return to the tripartite terminology again. Besides quick money and an exciting
lifestyle, the syndicate-raj (as it is referred to in the media, the syndicates being the real
power-brokers locally) seems to have provided an avenue for the aspirations of the lower-
castes, be it for respect, or at least to escape the entrapments of being a chhotolok. The
upper-caste bhadralok heritage will remain elusive for most, but at least they can climb
the social ladder to some degree and be a borolok.
 
Conclusion
25 The multiple narratives around Rajarhat indicate a qualitative shift in the politics of the
rural. As the old politics of citizenship withers away in the villages with the increasing
penetration of market forces, a new politics is being produced via the interaction of a
ubiquitous neoliberal development with its collateral, the multitude of dispossessed and
disenfranchised.  A  point  can  be  raised  about  whether  this  politics  is  significantly
indicative of a transforming rural, or is just a continuation of similar trends in urban/
peri-urban areas, and there are indeed linkages between the two. However, the Rajarhat 
story reflects traits that are both distinctive and also link to changes witnessed across
rural India. On the one hand, given the West Bengal exceptionalism as far as caste-based
mobilization is concerned, the shifting dynamics brought by the new town project points
to the regional specificity of the story. One the other hand, first, the large scale capitalist
expropriation of land is undeniably changing the rural like never before, and yet the
“development” processes that engulf rural societies promising urban regeneration tend
to bypass the dispossessed. As the rapidly deteriorated farming conditions in Rajarhat 
demonstrate,  such  processes  create  their  own  wasteland—the  social  space  of  a
dispossessed labor force—thereby reshaping and restructuring rural-urban relations in
post-colonial  societies  (Bhattacharya  and  Sanyal 2011).  Second,  there  is  underlying
violent nature of this expropriation.  The tactics used by the CPIM to capture land is
symptomatic  of  what  Le Mons Walker  (2008)  identifies  to  be  a  key  trend  in  the
countryside: the use of officially sanctioned criminal violence at the level of the state and
by private landholders against the rural poor. In a neoliberal context, that violence forms
the political and social corollary to the economic internal colonization of the poor. Third,
there is the changing nature of rural proletariat. Given the continuing farmer resistance
to  dispossession across  the  country,  the  agrarian questions  of  labor  and capital  are,
consequently,  now re-joined in  the  land question,  amplifying existing inequalities  in
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novel ways (Levien 2012).  The rise of syndicates and the renewed caste dynamics are
reflective of what Levien describes as the involutionary dynamic of agrarian change that
is  ultimately  impoverishing  for  the  rural  poor  (Levin 2012;  see  also  Agarwal  and
Levien 2019). In Rajarhat, the dispossessed cannot look to this new “development” with
desire, but they cannot abandon it either, thereby ending up negotiating new forms of
political adjustment. There remains a memory, but there is nothing in the present that
one identifies with, the dispossession thus not only being from economic means, but also
from identity. Ranjit Nashkar, an elderly inhabitant of Patharghata, evocatively recalled:
I used to live in Patharghata, went to school in Kochpukur, and used to play in that
field  next  to  the  Talpukur  pond.  But  no  one  recognises  these  names  anymore.
Instead,  I  am a  resident  of  Action  Area  II.  They  have  erased  my existence,  my
identity, and also that of my forefathers. Not only is my land gone, but so are my
memories.23
The role of the state in enacting this transformation in the villages,  the concomitant
displacement,  marginalization,  and newer  forms of  socio-economic  engagements  also
define these politics. Displacement is “constructed” by the state, its institutions, political
entities, local actors and networks, a trend not only evident in Rajarhat, but across India,
and indeed across the global South. The politics thus need to be looked for in this process
of construction, and in the relation between what it produces and leaves behind. This
paper  has  tried  to  explore  this  relation  in  the  rural  vestiges  left  behind  by  the
urbanization  process  in  Rajarhat,  as  it  brought  about  large  scale  displacement-
dispossession and rapid socio-economic changes in rural lives. The caste perspective, in
turn, while adding to the debate on the relevance of caste consciousness in a bhadralok
dominated Bengali  society,  also symbolizes this relationship.  The paper refrains from
claiming any direct causal link between the displacement narratives and the reoriented
caste-dynamics. The relationship between the two is often multifaceted and is expressed
differently in different parts of the country. However, at least two types of analytical
linkages  weave  the  various  parts  of  the  Rajarhat  story  together.  First,  Rajarhat  is
demonstrative of how processes of capitalist  accumulation can lead to caste-relations
being simultaneously reinvented and redeployed in a rapidly transforming rural society
in newer forms. Second, the story also shows how the new economic arrangements that
emerge  as  a  result  of  such  accumulation  and  transformation  can  both  aid  this
reinvention,  while  also  reinforcing  new  forms  of  stratification.  The  duality  of  this
relational politics, in this sense, is in the way the modern (the transforming rural economy
as a result of rapid urbanization) cohabits with the traditional (the social hierarchies), and
is legitimized by it.
26 It is this cohabitation and legitimization that symbolizes not only the core conflict of
Rajarhat, but also that of contemporary rural societies in India. The unique nature of West
Bengal—the political stability of the LF as well as the domination of the casteless bhadralok
—does make it a rather special case among the chaotic Indian democracy. But what the
Rajarhat story also signals in a broader sense is the overwhelming transformations that
Indian  rural  society  has  undergone  over  the  last  few  decades,  the  changing  power
relationships and the consequences, the heterogeneity of Indian rural social space, its
stratification  and  deeply  entrenched  economic  and  social  divisions.  The  economic
stratification  induced  by  displacement-dispossession  often  reinforces  the  traditional
social hierarchies where the upper caste with social and economic capital emerges as the
primary  beneficiary  of  “development”.  In  Rajarhat,  the  importance  of  achieving  the
bhadralok status, or at least a borolok,  is rooted in an economic dispossession that has
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reasserted the social entrapments of being a chhotolok. Robbed of their legitimate socio-
economic relations of production on the one hand and their memories and identity on
the  other,  the  chhotolok  is  now  in  a  perpetual  search  for  both  sustenance  and  ijjat
(respect). The cross-cutting themes of displacement, dispossession, identity, and social
hierarchies are thereby symbolic of the heterogeneous and unequal stratification that are
blatantly evident across the Indian countryside. Albeit often side-lined in the global city/
urbanization discourses and the broader debates about the neoliberal  onslaught,  it  is
important  to  recognize  and  unpack—as  this  volume  aptly  demonstrates—this
stratification and the transformative processes in rural societies and livelihood.
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NOTES
1. There  is  an  emerging  body  of  literature  on  this  theme.  See,  for  example,  Levien  (2013);
Feldman and Geisler (2012); Adnan (2013); Cross (2014).
2. A mouza is an area comprising multiple settlements, taken as a revenue collection unit in a
pargana (revenue district).
3. Eventually, 45 mouzas were notified for acquisition (HIDCO 2012).
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4. As per HIDCO (2012), the entire planning area today stands at 9390 hectares. 6839.31 hectares
had been acquired by 2012.
5. A katha (or kattha or cottah) is a unit of land measurement, approximately equal to 720 sq. feet
or 66.89 sq. metres.
6. Nagarik Mancha (citizens’ platform) is a Kolkata based non-political civil society organisation.
7. It  is  difficult  to  ascertain the caste  affiliations of  the primary victims of  the urbanisation
process, as neither existing government reports nor any other study documents that level of
detail. But anecdotal evidence across the villages reflects a familiar pattern of low caste groups
suffering the brunt of it (particularly the Namasudra caste, which is the most prominent across
Rajarhat).
8. Between 1998 and 2001, the records show no change in the data, hence it is encapsulated in
one row.
9. Interview, 20th April 2017, Salt Lake, Kolkata.
10. Interview, 21st April 2017, Kolkata.
11. There is  also a strong body of historical  and sociological  literature on caste dynamics in
colonial Bengal (Bandyopadhyay 1990; Chatterjee 1979; Sen 2014), and also in contemporary West
Bengal (Roy 2012).
12. Literally  meaning  “respectable  people”  or  “gentlemen,”  an  elite  class  of  regional
intelligentsia  unique to  the Bengali-speaking area.  The mainstay of  Bengali  communism,  the
bhadralok, had turned to Marxism as a political creed in the 1930s (Franda 1971; Chatterjee 1997).
The  bhadralok status  was  not  ascribable  but  had  to  be  achieved  via  cultural  and  political
sophistication,  where caste  was  supposedly  not  important.  In  reality,  the  bhadralok  belonged
overwhelmingly to the upper castes, whilst the lower castes, predominantly involved in low-paid
manual jobs, were referred to as the chhotolok (low/non-respectable people). The term chhotolok 
can also be a term of abuse, often used by the bhadralok to denigrate one of their own caste
(Roy 2012). The embedded politics of caste-hierarchy is thus not only entrenched in the upper-
caste consciousness,  but beneath the radar of aggregate electoral politics,  continues as a key
organising principle of social lives (Chandra et al. 2015).
13. The available public  data from the district  statistical  handbooks is  often not updated,  as
evident here (the total population and Muslim population data remains unchanged between 2001
and 2003). Subsequent handbooks until 2011 use the same 2003 data.
14. Interview, 9th April 2017, Aatghora, Rajarhat.
15. Interview, 10th April 2017, Tarulia, Rajarhat.
16. Interview, 20th April 2017, Patharghata, Rajarhat.
17. Interviews, 20th and 21st April, Patharghata, Tarulia, and Mahishbathan, Rajarhat.
18. Interview, 20th April 2017, Patharghata, Rajarhat.
19. It  is  also possible  to  add the term gorib-lok,  which means the economically  poor,  to  this
terminology. The bhadralok can be a gorib-lok as well (although rarely), but is likely to be looked
upon sympathetically owing to his social/cultural capital. The borolok is not poor, but is looked
upon  suspiciously  for  having  progressed  in  class  terms  despite  coming  from  a  lower  social
stratum. And it is almost natural for the chhotolok to also remain a gorib-lok owing to his low-
caste. However, out of all the terms, gorib-lok is an expression of class-relations alone, while the
rest are indicative of either caste-status (chhotolok)  or both (bhadralok and borolok).  Hence the
focus is on the tripartite terminology.
20. Interview, 30th April 2017, Rajarhat.
21. Interview, 1st May 2017, Aatghora, Rajarhat.
22. Interview, 1st May 2017, Mahishbathan, Rajarhat.
23. Interview, 22nd April 2017, Patharghata, Rajarhat.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper explores the political churnings around an almost twenty-year-old process of land
acquisition and development in Rajarhat, an erstwhile rural settlement in the Indian state of West
Bengal. The narrative takes shape against the backdrop of a neo-liberal state in the global South
acting  as  a  corporate  facilitator,  the  concomitant  dispossession,  and  particularly  the
transformation of the villages and rural livelihoods. The paper tries to trace the nature of this
transformation by mapping the socio-economic changes on the one hand, and the reinvention of
traditional  caste-based  social  hierarchies  brought  about  by  such  changes  on  the  other,  and
highlights the formation of “syndicates” (low-level cartels) in the area as a unique manifestation
of the latter. Such developments, the paper argues, symbolize a qualitative shift in rural social
relations, brought about by rapid urbanization in neoliberal India.
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